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(Editor’s Note) This article is part of  a special Left History series reflecting upon 
changing boundaries in the practice of  left history, and outlining the challenges his- 
torians of  the left must face in the current tumultuous political climate. This series 
extends a conversation first convened in a 2006 special edition of  Left History (11.1), 
which asked the question, “what is left history?” In the updated series, contributors 
were asked a slightly modified question: “what does it mean to write ‘left’ history?” 
 
In the introductory essay to his 1971 book In Red and Black, the (in)famous American 
historian Eugene Genovese discussed the role of  the socialist historian. At the time, 
he identified two prevailing normative prescriptions for radical scholars in general, 
both of  which he opposed. The first of  these prescriptions was one that emphasized 
political action, over and above scholarly pursuits, as a foremost imperative. “After 
all,” Genovese asked in imitation of  those who defended this view, “how can we 
sit around and discuss medieval France while children are being napalmed in Viet-
nam?”1 The second prescription, which allowed more significance for scholarly ac-
tivity, demanded that research be focused in those particular areas that were 
pertinent to and engaged with contemporary struggles. For Genovese, this model 
encouraged engagement with the quite-recent past. In each case, he argued, the fun-
damental assumption was that a socialist historian, as a kind of  radical scholar, also 
ought to be a political activist and thus the only appropriate history was that which 
was written explicitly because it was relevant in the present. The result, as Genovese 
saw it, was that leftist historians, especially younger ones, had their energies stretched 
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counterproductively in two directions until they reached an eventual realization that 
“being a good historian is full-time work.”2 Genovese’s own perspective was that 
the role of  the socialist historian was to be, simply, a good historian.3 He dismissed 
the imperative of  relevance as “irrelevant to anything of  importance beyond the 
egos of  those who prate about it,” and contended instead “that the study of  history, 
and in fact all humane learning, is the major responsibility of  those intellectuals 
who would work for a better society.”4 
The animating context for Genovese’s essay is important to note. Among 
the issues he discussed were the Vietnam War, the Cold War, the New Left, and an 
American academy in which, as he saw it at the time, “it sometimes appears that 
everyone on the campuses who does not like Spiro Agnew finds it necessary to be 
‘a bit of  a Marxist’ in order to get students to listen to him.”5 The discussion of  
these issues marks the essay as a product of  a particular historical moment very dif-
ferent from our own. In 1971, the “stakes” for writing history from the left were 
established perhaps most clearly by a violent global struggle between communist 
and capitalist powers and the existence of  transnational movements—decoloniza-
tion, the anti-war movement, New Leftism, and so on— that could be readily iden-
tified and readily identified with. This was a world in which ideological struggles 
and political-economic alternatives were front of  mind, and not just for historians. 
The contemporary left historian exists in a much different context. In the interven-
ing decades since Genovese wrote, political, economic, and social changes have ren-
dered an altogether distinct and novel conjuncture in which historians with 
counter-hegemonic commitments now find themselves. Those inclined to name 
this conjuncture have typically called it “neoliberalism.”  
Describing the current epoch under the banner of  neoliberalism is a some-
what fraught endeavour. Hardly anyone denies that, from some point in the 1970s, 
the post-war Keynesian settlement in Western nation-states was dismantled as a 
fundamentally distinct political economy took shape. In 1971, the Bretton Woods 
system and its associated capital controls collapsed, clearing the way for financial-
ization, deregulation, and privatization in states across the world.6 This transforma-
tive political economy has often been called neoliberal, though there are a number 
of  other ways in which the term has been used. In addition to its general function 
in identifying a political-economic epoch, neoliberalism has also been understood 
variously as an economic policy package, an ideology, an intellectual movement, 
and a new rationality. This multivalence has contributed to the growth of  rich his-
torical and theoretical literatures, though it has also prompted sustained criticism 
of  neoliberalism’s conceptual utility. Adding to the discussion recently is an emerg-
ing sense that the global rise of  far-right nationalism—from Trump’s America to 
Modi’s India—might represent either a looming reorientation away from the ne-
oliberal consensus or a realization of  the anti-democratic tendencies long nascent 
in neoliberal practice. From a left perspective, these debates about the meaning and 
the current state of  neoliberalism are of  significance for the ways in which they 
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have and will continue to shape counter-hegemonic challenges. More particularly, 
for historians with a sense that historical writing can serve a counter-hegemonic 
function, how we choose to understand neoliberalism has serious ramifications for 
how we might identify the purpose(s) of  writing history today. In view of  how the 
world has changed since the 1970s, it is now worth asking whether, in addition to 
the indisputable need for left history to be “good” history, there might be some 
particularly urgent purposes that left history ought to serve.  
Among the existing interpretations of  neoliberalism, the most alarming 
is that of  the “new rationality,” advanced in its most recent and most convincing 
form by political theorist Wendy Brown. In Undoing the Demos, Brown writes that  
 
“as a normative order of  reason developed over three decades 
into a widely and deeply disseminated governing rationality, ne-
oliberalism transmogrifies every human domain and endeavor, 
along with humans themselves, according to a specific image of  
the economic.”7  
 
Neoliberalism thus has a totalizing effect, extending its logic into all areas of  life 
and rendering the neoliberal subject as a purely economic actor whose central task 
is to develop and position itself  as a bit of  what, in contemporary parlance, is often 
called “human capital.”8 This understanding of  neoliberal reason then serves, for 
Brown, as an origin point for an investigation of  the effect that neoliberalism has 
upon the operation of  democracy. What Brown ultimately finds is that, from the 
institutional structures of  democracy to its cultural underpinnings, the neoliberal 
economization of  all life represents a profound threat to democratic practice.9 
Brown locates the novelty of  neoliberal economization in three areas. First, 
whereas classical liberal theorists were always very much concerned about the rela-
tionship between the political and the economic, neoliberal logic collapses the dis-
tinction between the two. As Brown puts it, this means that “we are everywhere 
homo oeconomicus and only homo oeconomicus.”10 Furthermore, human capital in a ne-
oliberal context is not deemed useful in terms of  exchange or interest but in terms 
of  the ways it can be leveraged competitively. This is related to Brown’s third point, 
which is that the neoliberal subject now tends to be molded according to the tem-
plate of  finance capital, rather than in a more straightforwardly productive fashion. 
Collectively, these distinguishing features of  the neoliberal period differentiate it 
from earlier periods in the history of  liberal capitalism by removing the political 
brakes, as it were. While at times in the past it could, at least, be hoped that liberal 
democracy might represent some faint promise of  rule by the people and in accor-
dance with the principles of  freedom and equality, neoliberalism seems to foreclose 
upon such hope as it normalizes and extends rule by capital.11 
Neoliberalism’s usurpation of  democratic possibility, Brown points out in 
the epilogue to her book, applies not just to liberal democracy but to radical democ-
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racy as well. The disappearance of  a political brake on the mechanisms of  econo-
mization, in the form of  meaningful liberal democracy, is also the disappearance 
of  an important terrain for radical agitation. While in earlier conjunctures liberal 
democratic ideals could be put to use in criticizing and even limiting the excesses 
of  the market, sometimes serving in the development of  counter-hegemonic alter-
natives to liberal capitalism, neoliberalism extinguishes these prospects. As Brown 
writes, “when liberal democracy is fully transformed into market democracy, what 
disappears is this capacity to limit, this platform of  critique, and this source of  rad-
ical democratic inspiration and aspiration.”12 For the left, she concludes by noting, 
the implications of  this process of  democratic destruction are profound. As demo-
cratic horizons recede into increasing blurriness and the exigencies of  getting by 
consume ever more of  people’s time and energy, the tasks of  challenging neoliberal 
rationality and offering a viable alternative become increasingly difficult. In a world 
that relentlessly encourages people to think and act exclusively in economic terms, 
the project of  developing a democratic counter-hegemony that encourages living 
and thinking otherwise is made both challenging and urgent.13  
For left historians, Brown’s book suggests the crucial task of  writing his-
tories that challenge neoliberal common sense and recover a sense of  alterity in the 
past and the future. Of  course, writing against some ingrained common sense is 
not new as far as the left-historical tradition is concerned. Thus, Brown’s account 
of  neoliberalism does not require some grand initiation of  an unseen critical mode. 
Rather, it implies the contemporary significance of  renewing, increasing, and refin-
ing this kind of  counter-hegemonic scholarly energy. Fortunately, writing left history 
against neoliberalism need not imply the sort of  narrowness that Genovese was 
concerned with as he discussed the role of  the socialist historian almost 50 years 
ago. Surely, fodder for critique and evidence of  alterity can be found in a great va-
riety of  pasts, both recent and not-so-recent. Accordingly, any attempt to delineate 
topical or temporal boundaries beyond which left historians cannot go is not a 
worthwhile endeavour. While writing the history of  neoliberalism itself  surely stands 
out as among the most pressing concerns for left historians today, it need not be an 
all-consuming focus.14  
In his recent book, The Moral Economists, intellectual historian Tim Rogan 
has elegantly reconstructed a critical historical tradition that contemporary scholars 
might look to for an indication of  just how left history against neoliberalism could 
be written. Focused mainly on three well-known intellectuals in twentieth century 
Britain—R.H. Tawney, Karl Polanyi, and E.P. Thompson—Rogan describes a his-
tory of  “moral critique” that “was a success before it was a failure.”15 The work of  
these “moral economists” is posed against what Rogan sees as the dominant mode 
of  contemporary criticism of  capitalism, defined by a focus on material inequality. 
Without disregarding the importance of  this inequality and its deeply detrimental 
social effects, he identifies in Tawney, Polanyi, and Thompson an alternative and 
complementary model in which a certain notion of  human personality sustained 
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an effort to critically evaluate the history of  capitalism.16 The moral economists’ 
histories of  capitalism, as Rogan presents them, are worth considering as exemplars 
for left history against neoliberalism.  
From Tawney’s 1926 book Religion and the Rise of  Capitalism, through 
Polanyi’s The Great Transformation, published in 1944, and up to Thompson’s 1963 
classic on The Making of  the English Working Class, Rogan sees a developing moral 
critique becoming increasingly viable at each step. Tawney is thus presented as an 
inaugural figure who, despite certain limits and inadequacies in his thinking, initiated 
what was ultimately a productive mode of  criticizing capitalism. In Religion and the 
Rise of  Capitalism, Tawney focused his attention most especially on the seventeenth 
century and found in that period an increasing “spiritual blindness” accompanied 
by the ascendance of  property as the governing mechanism of  human association. 
The rise of  property was, for Tawney, a social corruption that contributed to a com-
mensurate decline in the significance attributed to human personality. And person-
ality mattered, to Tawney, “because it was the nearest we come to knowing God.”17 
In his examination of  Tawney, then, Rogan narrates an effort to critique capitalism 
via the invocation of  a theologically derived commitment to human personality as 
a moral baseline. Tawney’s aim was to convince his readers that the moral precepts 
operant in religious life ought to apply equally in social, economic, and political life 
as well.18  
Where Tawney based his critique of  capitalism in theology, Polanyi gave 
his a secular grounding. Likewise taking an idea of  human personality as funda-
mental, he first looked to Marx’s notion of  the “fully human” to make his case. But 
before Polanyi had even finished The Great Transformation, an attempt to recount the 
rise of  liberal capitalism from out of  the socioeconomic arrangements of  medieval 
England, he became convinced that Marx was an inadequate guide in this regard. 
Instead of  adopting a Marxian definition of  the human in order to criticize the ten-
dency of  capitalism to encroach and extend its logic into non-economic life, Polanyi 
eventually turned, somewhat surprisingly, to Adam Smith. In Smith, notwithstanding 
some particularities of  his work, Polanyi found a humanistic thinker who assumed 
from the beginning that economic issues were to be considered in the context of  
existing moral and political paradigms. Thus, he rejected the more strictly utilitarian 
mode of  political economy that emerged in the 1830s and which, he thought, in-
cluded Marx. This commitment to a humanistic political-economic perspective was, 
for Polanyi, the best launching point for an historical critique of  capitalism and its 
tendency to economize previously non-economic life.19  
In his time, Polanyi was not all that well received or widely read, facts 
which Rogan attributes to his limited capabilities as an historian. While Polanyi’s re-
constituted political economy did enable the development of  a novel perspective, 
the redemption of  the promise in such a perspective was dependent upon historical 
analysis. E.P. Thompson accordingly appears, after Polanyi, as the twentieth century 
moral critic of  capitalism who most capably realized the promise of  the tradition. 
Review Essay 93
In Thompson’s writings, Rogan argues, the moral critique of  capitalism reached the 
extent of  its influence. As the inheritor of  the historical analysis initiated by Tawney 
and secularized by Polanyi, Thompson “perfected their common project by finding 
new words to articulate what his precursors had been trying to describe.”20 In par-
ticular, by pioneering the concept of  a “moral economy” as an historical develop-
ment that occurred simultaneously with the rise of  capitalism, Thompson was able 
to conceptualize capitalism not just as a system that had sidelined a pre-existing 
morality, but one that promoted the emergence of  new solidarities in the process.21 
This account of  the transition to capitalism was thus defined by a sense of  incon-
clusiveness that could be extended into the present and encourage a sense that 
things could, somehow, be different.22 
After accounting for all the particular contingencies that contributed to 
the decline of  the moral critique of  capitalism from the 1970s, Rogan ends his book 
by suggesting that the work of  Tawney, Polanyi, and, especially, Thompson remains 
highly relevant in the present. His discussion to this end unfolds mainly via a survey 
of  social choice theory as an area in which the moral critique has been helpfully re-
vived.23 For left historians, however, the most relevant aspect of  Rogan’s recon-
struction has to do more generally with the ways in which the moral economists 
used history in order to critique extant social and economic arrangements. As Rogan 
writes, each of  the intellectuals he discusses appealed to history in the process of  
“reminding readers that arrangements some contemporary writers made to seem 
natural and inevitable were in fact mutable and contingent, making social forms 
and economic norms malleable, facilitating debate about reform.”24 A similar rev-
elation of  alternative possibility must be a central aspect of  left history in the age 
of  neoliberalism, defined as it is by the spread of  an economic rationality that makes 
such possibility increasingly difficult to imagine. 
Taken together, Brown and Rogan’s work provide a sense of  urgency, a 
critical precedent, and a lens through which to assess Genovese’s claim that mere 
quality ought to be the defining feature of  left history. Surely, the importance of  
good historical work was as indisputable when Genovese wrote as it is now. But in 
rendering neoliberalism as such a profoundly deleterious phenomenon for any 
hopes of  genuine, or even limited, democracy, Brown highlights the necessity of  a 
left history that is concerned with revealing alternative possibility outside the total-
izing economic logic of  the current conjuncture. The moral economists that Rogan 
discusses, for their part, give an indication of  the intellectual spirit in which this 
left-historical work might be undertaken. Ultimately, if  left history is to contribute 
to the destruction of  neoliberal common sense, it is most well-suited to doing so 
via historical critique that, by revealing latent alternatives in the past, suggests real 
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